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IS DISHONESTY CONTAGIOUS?
ROBERT INNES AND ARNAB MITRA∗
When an individual believes that peers are predominantly untruthful in a given
situation, is he/she more likely to be untruthful in that situation? We study this question
in deception experiments patterned after Gneezy [Gneezy U. “Deception: The Role of
Consequences.” American Economic Review, 95, 2005, 384–94] and conducted in
Arizona, California, and India. We find evidence that dishonesty is indeed contagious.
(JEL D03)
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of individual honesty and
trustworthiness in economic interactions is well
known. These attributes facilitate cooperative
relationships, enable contracts, strengthen legal
and regulatory institutions, and, as a result, pro-
mote economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales 2004; Zak and Knack 2001). Also well
known are vast differences in these attributes
across cultures and countries. Figure 1 illustrates
these differences, showing proportions of world
population and world economic activity (respec-
tively) that derive from countries with high,
medium, and low levels of corruption, as mea-
sured by Transparency International’s 2005 cor-
ruption perception index (CPI). Without reading
too much into these coarse numbers (which, of
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course, raise complex questions of cause and
effect), we note a stylized fact: The distribu-
tion of corruption is largely bimodal, with the
vast majority of both population and economic
activity in either the low CPI (advanced devel-
oped) or high CPI (Third World and transition)
countries.1
In this paper, we explore a possible con-
tributing explanation for this phenomenon that
is rooted in individual preferences. Specifically,
we conjecture that honesty is contagious in
the following sense: If a majority of one’s
peers are perceived to be honest, an indi-
vidual is likely to suffer a larger aversion
penalty/disutility when behaving dishonestly.
If so, honesty breeds honesty and dishonesty
breeds dishonesty. Such responses can push
countries and cultures toward either predomi-
nantly honest or predominantly dishonest behav-
ior, once tipped in one direction or the other.
They can thus help explain (or reinforce other
explanations for) bimodal outcomes akin to
1. We stress the illustrative character of Figure 1. While
the CPI is widely considered a good measure of corruption
(see, e.g., Mo 2001; Treisman 2000), the twin phenomena
of dishonesty (our focus) and corruption (Figure 1) are,
while clearly related, not isomorphic. The two words are
often used interchangeably, with bribe-taking officials alter-
nately called “corrupt” and “dishonest” (e.g., Bardhan 1997,
p. 1332). However, we do not study links between these two
phenomena in this paper.
ABBREVIATIONS
CPI: Corruption Perception Index
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FIGURE 1
Distribution of World GDP and World
Population by Level of Corruption
Proportion
Note: Corruption is measured by Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perception Index. “Less Corrupt” coun-
tries are those with CPI values in the top third of the range;
“Medium Corrupt” in the middle third; and “Highly Cor-
rupt” in the bottom third. We exclude India and China from
the population distribution, but include them in the gross
domestic product (GDP) distribution.
those in Figure 1.2 However, they do not tell us
why one country or culture goes in one direc-
tion—why one culture is “more honest” and
another “less honest.” Moreover, they suggest
that behavior is malleable in that, if perceptions
of predominating behavior change (from dishon-
est to honest, for example), individual choices
conform. As a result, the bimodal-type outcomes
predicted by contagion are potentially fragile; if
perceptions of behavior change, then behavior
changes with them.
We study the contagion conjecture in the con-
text of a simple deception experiment, wherein
we stimulate different subject perceptions of
the propensity for honesty in the overall group
2. Andvig and Moene (1990), among others, develop
models of corruption that give rise to a “Shelling diagram” of
behavior in which there are two stable equilibria: all corrupt
and none corrupt (see Bardhan 1997). Drawing on a vari-
ant of Frank’s (1987) model, Innes (2009) produces a similar
diagram of honest versus dishonest behavior. Another possi-
ble explanation for bimodal corruption outcomes is a vicious
cycle in which low incomes promote corruption which, in
turn, deters growth and so on. There is a vast literature
on the evolution of institutions and their relationship to
corruption and growth (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001). One interpretation of our paper, in the con-
text of this literature, is that there may be self-reinforcing
dynamics to the evolution of bad and good economic
institutions.
of experimental subjects. We then examine
the resulting impact on an individual’s choice
between truthful and untruthful behavior. Our
experiments mimic the original deception game
designed by Gneezy (2005), who studied the
effects of different payoffs on individuals’ aver-
sion to untruthful behavior. Unlike Gneezy
(2005), we consider a single set of payoffs in
each experiment and focus on the possibility
of contagion.3 Because a central motive for our
inquiry is to study whether perceived norms of
honesty or dishonesty among peers spur more
truthful or less truthful conduct in societies that
are alternately considered corrupt or not corrupt,
we conduct our experiments in both a low CPI
country (the United States) and a high CPI coun-
try (India). Broadly speaking, we find evidence
for contagion in both countries.
To our knowledge, the only study that (indi-
rectly) addresses the question of contagion in
honesty is Fisman and Miguel’s (2007) famous
paper on the tendency for diplomats to gar-
ner parking tickets in New York; they find
that the immunity-protected foreigners take their
home country propensities for lawlessness with
them. While these results might be interpreted as
evidence against contagion (because diplomats
seem to ignore U.S. values in their behavior),
we believe that such inferences are misplaced
for two reasons. First, there is no ceteris paribus
in this comparison; diplomats may well tem-
per their lawless behavior, relative to what they
would do if protected by immunity in their
home countries. Second, the empirical obser-
vation may be a reflection of different relevant
peer groups for diplomats from different coun-
tries, consistent with the contagion hypothesis.
We therefore offer a direct test of contagion in
this paper.
Our study is related to recent experimen-
tal economics literature on the effects of social
information on behavior and a large psychol-
ogy literature on conformity (see Cialdini and
Goldstein 2004, for a review), but is dis-
tinguished from this work by its focus on
3. Other recent experimental work on deception games
include Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007), who study links
between a subject’s willingness to punish lies of others
and their aversion to lying; Ederer and Fehr (2007), who
study impacts of deception and aversion to lying in a princi-
pal agent game; Sutter (2009), who identifies sophisticated
deception; Rode (2010), who studies effects of compet-
itive and cooperative priming on subjects’ honesty; and
Charness and Dufwenberg (2005) who provide an alter-
native (guilt aversion) interpretation of Gneezy’s (2005)
findings.
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subjects’ truthfulness—our research question.
Unlike a significant subset of the literature
(but not all), our design also voids preva-
lent theoretical explanations for conformity and
obeying social norms, including social sanc-
tions for the violation of norms (see Fehr and
Fischbacher 2004), incentives to obtain social
esteem (Bernheim 1994), and benefits from
others’ information (Banerjee 1992). In our
experiments, individual actions are unobserv-
able to anyone other than the individual, there
is no possibility of social sanction or building
social esteem, and what others do has no bear-
ing on the payoff consequences of individual
decisions.4
Perhaps most closely related to the present
paper is work on social information in dictator
games.5 In Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), dicta-
tors are given different information about the
proportion of subjects in a prior session who
were “fair” versus “selfish,” and who believe
dictators should be fair versus selfish. Their
results generally suggest that fairness in actions
is contagious. Krupka and Weber (2009) expose
dictators to a sample of four (fair vs. selfish)
allocations of prior dictators and find a signif-
icant increase in the fraction of fair allocations
when the sample share is (3/4) or 1 versus
(1/2) or less. Cason and Mui (1998) find that
exposing dictators to one prior dictator alloca-
tion decision (vs. irrelevant information) reduces
their propensity for selfish allocations. Duffy
and Kornienko (2010) show that introducing a
tournament that alternately ranks subjects’ giv-
ings or earnings significantly promotes generous
4. An interesting paper by Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg
(2008) finds that, in public field experiments, subjects tend
to violate one norm (the target) more frequently when they
see that another norm (the contextual norm) is violated.
For example, if graffiti is present (despite a “no graffiti”
sign), subjects are more likely to litter. There are three key
differences with the present study: (1) Keizer, Lindenberg,
and Steg (2008) are concerned with cross-norm contagion,
whereas we focus on within-norm contagion; (2) we focus
on deception, rather than norm-violating public actions
(littering or swiping cash); and (3) subject decisions are
public, whereas they are private in our study. The last
difference implies that, in Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg
(2008), subject behavior may potentially be due to effects
of the contextual norm treatments on the perceived risk of
either law enforcement or social sanctions against violation
of the target norm. Social sanctions are not possible in our
experiments.
5. In a dictator game, a “dictator” allocates a given
pot of money (e.g., $10) between himself and one other
player (his Receiver). “Fair” allocations split the money
more evenly (50–50 or 60–40), while “selfish” allocations
split the money less evenly (80–20, for example).
and selfish allocations, respectively; for our pur-
poses, these results could be interpreted as dicta-
tors’ response to a norm revealed by the choice
of tournament. As in our experiments, subjects’
actions in these studies are private, there are no
social sanctions or rewards, and what others do
is irrelevant to payoffs.6
The major difference in our experiments
is the focus on deception rather than dictator
games. This distinction, we believe, is central.
Selfish behavior (as in a dictator game) and dis-
honest behavior (as in a deception game) are
very different phenomena. While “fairness” may
help promote cooperative relationships (like
honesty), “selfish” and acquisitive impulses can
promote effort and innovation that are at the
core of a thriving market economy. In con-
trast, the negative consequences of dishonesty
and corruption for economic prosperity are well
documented. Perhaps for this reason, the culture
and psychology of the two phenomena are also
different. Selfishness is sometimes heralded as
a symptom of the drive to compete and win,
as in a game, but, in other contexts, scorned
as an impediment to cooperative relationships.
Honesty, on the other hand, is consistently pro-
moted as a value and virtue by church and
community, suggesting that contagion may be
less likely. Rode (2010), for example, finds that
subjects’ honesty is insensitive to competitive
versus cooperative priming.
A more subtle difference between the two
phenomena is also important: Contagion in dic-
tator games (as in Bicchieri and Xiao 2009)
can be explained by other-regarding preferences
of the type characterized by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), where subjects are averse to inequities
in payoffs between themselves and other play-
ers in the experiment. The reason is that a
higher propensity for fairness among an exper-
iment’s population of dictators (a) reduces a
“fair” dictator’s likelihood of earning less than
other dictators and (b) raises a “selfish” dic-
tator’s likelihood of earning more than other
dictators. Both effects raise inequity penalties
of “selfishness” and thereby promote choice
of a fair allocation. In contrast, Fehr–Schmidt
preferences imply the opposite of contagion
in our U.S. deception experiments: Incentives
for honesty fall with the perceived propensity
6. The possible exception is Duffy and Kornienko
(2010), where winning a tournament, even if the winner is
only identified anonymously (by ID number), may provide
some intrinsic reward.
INNES & MITRA: IS DISHONESTY CONTAGIOUS? 725
for honesty in the reference population of sub-
jects.7 This suggests that mechanisms underpin-
ning contagion in the two games (dictator vs.
deception) are different. This distinction is high-
lighted when we control for our treatment effects
on dictator outcomes in our experiments; we find
no effect of our “truthfulness” treatments on dic-
tator choices, but pronounced effects on honesty
(Sections II and III).
In sum, honesty (in deception games) and
fairness (in dictator games) are different phe-
nomena, and results from dictator experiments
cannot be translated to deception experiments;
indeed, even small framing differences in dicta-
tor games are known to have significant effects
on behavior, as shown by List (2007) and
Bardsley (2008).8
7. A higher perceived propensity for honesty among an
experiment’s population of Senders increases the probabil-
ity that Receivers obtain their high payoff, which raises the
net benefit to dishonesty by lowering the implied cost of
inequity. For our U.S. experiments, this effect tilts incen-
tives toward dishonesty, contrary to the contagion hypothe-
sis. Similar logic (for both dictator and deception games)
applies to spiteful (Fehr, Hoff, and Kshetramade 2008)
and equity-reciprocity-competition (Bolton and Ockenfels
2000) preferences. In our expanded paper, we explore in
detail these and other possible mechanisms underpinning
the contagion in honesty that we observe. We argue that
other-regarding preferences, such as Fehr-Schmidt (1999)
inequity aversion or Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) guilt
aversion (see also Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg 2006), cannot explain our find-
ings. As a result, we conjecture that contagion is the
outcome of “hard-wired” preferences, which motivates
an examination of evolutionary advantages of this trait
(Innes 2009).
8. Effects of social information have been studied in
a number of other contexts. In ultimatum games, Knez
and Camerer (1995) and Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)
examine effects of information about other proposer offers
on proposer and responder behavior, finding evidence of
a preexisting norm of equity. Several authors study the
role of social information in achieving social learning
and conditional cooperation in coordination games (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Chaudhuri, Graziano, and
Maitra 2006; Eckel and Wilson 2007; Fischbacher, Gachter,
and Fehr 2001; Schotter and Sopher 2003); in this work,
unlike ours and like studies by Chen et. al (2009) on on-
line participation in MovieLens and Duffy and Feltovich
(1999) on learning in ultimatum and best shot games, the
social information is potentially payoff relevant. Recent
field experiments on charitable contributions document that
subjects contribute more often when they believe a higher
fraction of their peers contribute (Frey and Meier 2004)
and contribute more when told that a prior contributor
contributed more (Shang and Croson 2009); in this work,
the social information can also be payoff relevant by
signaling the virtue of the charity. Overall, this work
provides evidence of contagion in different contexts, but
with potential channels of effect that are not at play in our
experiments.
II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED
STATES
A. The Arizona Classroom Experiment
To elicit honest or dishonest decisions from
subjects, we closely follow the deception game
designed by Gneezy (2005). In this game, there
are two possible payoff distributions for each
pair of players, with each pair comprised of
a “Sender” and a “Receiver.” The two distri-
butions are represented by Options A and B.
Only the Sender is informed about the pay-
ments associated with the two options, one of
which is advantageous to the Sender and the
other of which is advantageous to the Receiver.
The Sender sends one of two messages to the
Receiver:
Message A: “Option A will earn you (the
Receiver) more money than Option B.”
Message B: “Option B will earn you (the
Receiver) more money than Option A.”
A message is truthful if it truthfully indicates
the option that is advantageous to the Receiver.
After receiving the message chosen by the
Sender, the Receiver chooses an option, which
then determines payments. Both players are
fully informed about the rules of the game, but
Receivers are never informed about the specific
monetary consequences of either of the two
options.
In our experiment, we focus on a single set
of payment options (while randomly varying the
A/B labels attached to the two options). In one,
the Sender receives $6 and the Receiver obtains
$3, while in the other, the Sender receives $4
and the Receiver obtains $6.9
Our objective is to study how different per-
ceptions of the truthfulness of other Senders
affect Sender behavior. To do this, we use a
between-subjects design where we expose dif-
ferent groups of Senders to different treatments
designed to alter perceptions of other Sender
behavior. There are different ways to provide
this treatment information. In our California
9. There is no obvious choice of payment options. We
conducted preliminary surveys on alternative options that
varied (1) the gain to the Sender from lying GS (assuming
Receiver acceptance of recommendations), and (2) the cor-
responding Receiver loss LR. Consistent with expectations,
incentives to lie rise with GS and fall with LR. Our sur-
vey evidence implied an approximate Sender propensity for
truthfulness equal to 58% for GS = 2 and LR = 3 (our cho-
sen options). Armed with this evidence—and the conjecture
(wrong as it turned out) that actual dollar stakes would raise
incentives to lie—we settled on the indicated options.
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experiments, subjects drew five Sender mes-
sages (Truthful or Untruthful) from a box con-
taining actual Sender message choices made
in a prior experiment. In Arizona, we exposed
Senders to summary statements about the pro-
pensity for truthfulness in a (nonrandom) sample
of prior Sender messages. In the control treat-
ment, given to an initial session of subjects,
no information on other Sender behavior was
given. Using outcomes from the control treat-
ment, Senders in subsequent sessions were told:
Out of 20 Sender messages from a past session of this
experiment, with identical payment options, X (=Y%)
were UNTRUTHFUL and (20 − X) (= [100 − Y]%)
were TRUTHFUL.
Four treatments of this form were consid-
ered: Y = 15% (heavily truthful), Y = 40%,
Y = 60%, and Y = 85% (heavily untruthful).
In all treatments, the higher percentage was
reported first (so that, for example, when Y =
40%, the number and percent of truthful mes-
sages from past sessions was indicated first).
In all cases, there was a (nonrandom selected)
set of 20 messages from the control treatment
satisfying the above statement. Our approach
is similar to that used in other experimental
papers in the social influence literature. Frey and
Meier (2004), for example, report two differ-
ent percentages of past students who contribute
to a charity based on different outcomes from
a recent semester and, alternatively, a 10-year
interval. Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) report dif-
ferent shares of “fair” choices (40% and 60%)
from a past session and argue that the infor-
mation is truthful because they can select a past
session to satisfy either indicated percentage. We
designed our statements to highlight the selec-
tion of a subset of Sender messages and were
careful not to state or imply that the reported
messages represent a general pattern.10
10. A norm in experimental economics is that the exper-
imenter be honest with his/her subjects. We obey this norm
with our approach. However, our treatments are intended
to influence perceptions. We note that experimental designs
with such objectives are common in the experimental eco-
nomics literature. Prominent examples are influential papers
that report a subject’s “awarded” status “to suggest to the
(other) subjects that the high status was deserved” when in
fact it was randomly assigned (Ball et al. 2001), that expose
subjects to résumés with fictitious racial profiles (Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2004), that elicit contributions for a pub-
lic project given fictitious variation in seed money (List and
Reiley 2002), and that use a standard experimental protocol
to not inform subjects that they will be playing in subse-
quent rounds or roles (e.g., Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton
In all treatments, Senders were given gen-
eral information on the propensity of Receivers
to accept their recommendations. On the basis
of results from Gneezy’s (2005) experiments
(where 78% of Receivers followed the Sender
recommendations), we told all Senders the fol-
lowing:
In past experiments like this one, roughly 8 out of
10 Receivers chose the Option recommended by their
Senders.
Receivers were not given this information,
and Senders were so informed. To verify that
Senders generally believed that Receivers would
accept their recommendations, we followed
Gneezy’s (2005) approach, asking them to pre-
dict their Receiver’s choice and paying them for
a correct prediction. Overall, 73.4% of Senders
predicted that their Receiver would accept their
recommendation.11 These results indicate that
Senders generally expect their recommendations
to be followed; hence, their choices reflect a
concern for the “fairness”/morality of lying,
and not strategic motives. As it turned out,
73% of our Receivers followed their Sender
recommendations.
The experiment was conducted in undergrad-
uate economics classes at the University of Ari-
zona in Spring 2008 and Spring 2009. In total,
there were 233 Sender/Receiver pairs. Receivers
were in different classes than any of the Senders.
Anonymity of all participants was ensured by
identifying subjects with a randomly assigned
identification number that was also used to
match Senders to Receivers. Class Rosters were
used to ensure that no student participated more
than once.12 The experiment took approximately
10 minutes to run. Subject participation was
purely voluntary. Subjects were instructed to
communicate only with the experimenter and
were carefully monitored to this end. Control
1985; Duffy and Kornienko 2010). See Bonetti (1998) for a
lucid discussion of this topic.
11. In principle, risk aversion could motivate an
“accept” prediction by truthful Senders and a “reject” pre-
diction by untruthful Senders, with the prediction serving as
insurance. (If the Sender obtains the low payoff for the game,
the loss is offset by payment for the prediction.) However,
the proportion of truthful Senders predicting Receiver accept
decisions (74.8%) is essentially identical to the proportion
of untruthful Senders predicting accept decisions (72.0%)
in our experiment. Hence, risk aversion does not appear to
motivate Sender predictions in our experiment.
12. There was no overlap between the Receiver class
and any of the Sender classes. Two students who were
enrolled in two of the Sender classes were not present when
the second class experiment was performed.
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TABLE 1












Control 97 58.8 74.2
Y = 15% 25 64.0 −0.480 76.0
Y = 40% 26 53.8 0.455 80.8
Y = 60% 33 54.5 0.430 63.6
Y = 85% 52 19.2 5.349∗∗∗ 73.1
Overall 233 49.3 73.4
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level (two-sided).
TABLE 2
Probit Regression of Arizona Sender Message Choices (Truthful vs. Untruthful) with Course
Fixed Effects
Variable Coefficient z Statistic Marginal Effect z Statistic
Constant 0.7004∗∗ 2.06
Y = 85% Treatment −1.0385∗∗∗ −3.92 −0.3703∗∗∗ −4.58
Y = 60% Treatment −0.4358 −1.17 −0.1480 −1.25
Y = 40% Treatment −0.5554 −1.44 −0.1873 −1.58
Y = 15% Treatment 0.0206 0.06 0.0073 0.06
Note: N = 233. Dependent variable: sender message choice (truthful = 1, untruthful = 0). We report average marginal
effects. The fixed course effects are jointly insignificant, with χ2 (df = 5) test statistic (p value) 7.43 (.1904).
∗∗Significant at 5% (two-sided). ∗∗∗Significant at 1%.
treatments were run in each Sender class to con-
trol for any potential individual course effects.
Table 1 reports the number of Senders ex-
posed to each of the different treatments, and
summarizes our results. Table 2 reports results
of a probit regression of truthful (y = 1) ver-
sus untruthful (y = 0) choices on the treatments
and individual class fixed effects. Relative to
the control, the “heavily untruthful” treatment
(Y = 85%) has a significant impact on sub-
jects’ propensity to be truthful: the proportion
of untruthful messages rises from 41% (in the
control) to approximately 81% (under the treat-
ment), almost doubling. Other treatments have
no significant effect. We thus find evidence of
contagion in the sense that a strong propensity
for untruthfulness is contagious.
Sutter (2009) documents the importance of
“sophisticated deception,” when a Sender tells
the truth anticipating that his recommendation
will not be followed. He proposes a differ-
ent measure of deception that includes sophisti-
cated deceivers and excludes “benevolent liars”
who lie anticipating that their Receiver will
reject their recommendation. In our experi-
ment, the treatments concern raw actions of
other subjects (truthful vs. untruthful); we are
therefore also principally interested in effects
on raw actions (as reported above). The conclu-
sions of Table 1 nonetheless extend to Sutter’s
measure of sophisticated deception, although the
impact of our treatment is attenuated; the pro-
portion of Sutter-truth-tellers is 55.7% under the
control and 30.8% under the heavily untruthful
(Y = 85%) treatment, a difference that is statis-
tically significant (z = 3.06).13
B. Criticisms and the California Classroom
Experiment
In principle, other effects discussed in the
literature might be at play in our experiments.14
13. The proportions of Sutter-truth-tellers are 56%,
57.7%, and 60.6% under other (Y = 15%, 40%, and 60%)
treatments. Note that Sutter (2009) finds almost no “benev-
olent liars” in his experiment. In contrast, the proportion of
“benevolent liars” in our subject pool (14.2%) is roughly
the same as the proportion of “sophisticated liars” (12.4%);
we also find no clear pattern in this behavior across treat-
ments (e.g., in the proportion of liars who are benevolent or
the proportion of truth-tellers who are sophisticated liars).
These observations loosely suggest that the predictions of
our Reject-predicting subjects may be random, reflecting an
anticipation that the Receiver essentially flips a coin when
making his choice.
14. We are indebted to a prior reader for highlighting
these issues.
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First is the potential for experimenter demand
effects, with subjects trying to do what the
experimenter appears to want them to do (see
Duffy and Kornienko 2010, for an excellent
discussion). We sought to avoid any such effects
by ensuring anonymity and no communication
to subjects about the rather oblique intent or
purpose of the experiment. In Arizona, there was
also no significant impact of three of the four
(Y = 15%, 40%, 60%) treatments; were there
an experimenter demand effect, these treatments
would be expected to influence behavior. We,
nevertheless, seek to allay this concern with an
alternative design in the California experiment.
Second, could our results be because of
the effect of our treatments on generosity, as
opposed to their effect on subjects’ aversion to
lying? Perhaps when subjects learn that other
Senders are more untruthful, their preference for
the “selfish” (6–3) option versus the “generous”
(4–6) option (under the Arizona payoffs) rises;
if so, the propensity for untruthful message
choices will rise, even absent any effect on
subjects’ aversion to lying. We would like to
distinguish which channel of effect explains the
contagion that we observe.
To address these issues, our California exper-
iment modified the Arizona design in three
ways: (1) Subjects all played both a deception
game and a dictator game, with a coin flip
determining which game determined payoffs;
(2) we elicited Sender beliefs about the propor-
tion of truthful Senders in the experiment; and
(3) we used a different design for the treatments:
Rather than reading a statement on outcomes
from a nonrandom sample of prior messages,
Senders themselves each drew five Sender mes-
sages from a box containing all Sender messages
(truthful or untruthful) sent in a prior Arizona
experiment.15
The first change enables us to investigate
the effect of information about other Senders’
truthfulness on both preferences over allocations
(“generosity”) and lying aversion. The second
enables us to examine explicitly the impact of
Sender beliefs about other Senders’ truthfulness
on their own actions (truthfulness). And the third
mitigates the potential for experimenter demand
effects.
The payoff options in the California exper-
iment were the same as in Arizona (6–3 and
15. Each Sender drew from one of two boxes, one
containing messages from the Arizona Control treatment
experiment and one containing messages from the heavily
untruthful treatment (Y = 85%).
4–6). All Senders were given the same infor-
mation about the 80% propensity for Receivers
to accept their recommendations, and Receivers
were given the same (negligible) information as
in the Arizona game. All subjects played both
deception and dictator games.16 In the dictator
game, Senders simply chose one of the two pay-
off options (6–3 or 4–6). Following Gneezy
(2005), the Sender-chosen option was realized
with an 80% probability, and the other option
with a 20% probability, in order to mimic the
deception game wherein Receivers accept their
Sender recommendations with (approximately)
80% probability. The Sender instructions con-
veyed this probabilistic selection. If the Treat-
ments—the number of Truthful message draws,
ranging from zero to five out of five—were to
affect Sender generosity, we would expect to
observe Dictators choosing the more generous
(4–6) option more often when they obtained a
higher share of Truthful message draws.
We elicited Sender beliefs about the pro-
portion of Truthful Senders in their experiment
by asking the following: “What proportion of
Senders in this class do you think will send
Truthful messages? CIRCLE ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES. If your pre-
diction is correct (within five percentage points
of the actual choice, plus or minus), you will
receive an additional $1 payment.” Senders were
given twenty 5-percentage point bands from
which to choose (0–5, 5–10, etc.).
The experiment was conducted in undergrad-
uate economics classes at U.C. Merced in the
Spring of 2010. As always, subjects were com-
pletely anonymous, there was no communication
allowed, there were no class overlaps, and treat-
ments were randomly assigned. There were 105
Sender/Receiver pairs, 26 Senders in the Con-
trol (no message draws) and 79 in the “message
draw” Treatments.
16. The Deception game was denoted by K and the
dictator game by L. Senders were given the following
instructions: “You and your Receiver will participate in two
different decision-making situations, which we identify by
K and L below. Both of you will be paid for ONE of the
two situations. The situation for which you will be paid will
be determined by a flip of a coin after all decisions have
been made by all participants. You should therefore make
your decision in each situation as if it is the one for which
you will be paid.
• You and your Receiver will be paid for situation K if
the coin toss comes up Heads.
• You and your Receiver will be paid for situation L if
the coin toss comes up Tails.”
Receivers were given parallel instructions. The “Heads”
versus “Tails” determinants of outcomes was varied ran-
domly between Senders.
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TABLE 3
California Experiment: Raw Results




draws out of 5)
Untruthful (3-4-5 U
draws out of 5)
A. Deception
Observations 26 27 52
Percent Truthful 57.69 62.96 28.85
z Stat 1 (Cont. –Treat.) — −0.3925 2.4980∗∗
z Stat 2 (012 − 345) — — 3.0412∗∗∗
z Stat 3 (Cont. + 012 − 345) — — 3.4279∗∗∗
Average Sender Belief (SD) 28.65% (25.47) 50.28% (25.91) 32.31% (23.22)
z Stat for Belief (012 − Ct/345) 3.064∗∗∗ — 3.027∗∗∗
B. Dictator
Percent “Selfish” 69.23 81.48 65.38
z Stat 1 (Cont. –Treat.) — −1.0436 0.3434
z Stat 2 (012 − 345) — — 1.6144
z Stat 3 (Cont. +012 − 345) — — 1.1388
∗∗Significant at 5% (two-sided); ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Table 3A reports raw results from the Decep-
tion game. Roughly 58% of Control subjects
were truthful, almost exactly the same pro-
portion as in Arizona. Subjects who drew
two or fewer Untruthful messages (less than
half) exhibited no significant difference in their
propensity for truthfulness compared with Con-
trol subjects. However, subjects who drew three
or more Untruthful messages (more than half)
exhibited a significantly lower propensity for
truthfulness than their Control subject counter-
parts. Subjects who drew two or fewer Untruth-
ful messages also revealed average beliefs about
the fraction of Truthful Senders that were signifi-
cantly higher than for either the Control subjects
or subjects who drew three or more Untruth-
ful messages (see Average Sender Belief in
Table 3A). Hence, the experiment provides evi-
dence that the message draws affected Sender
beliefs about other Senders’ truthfulness in the
predicted direction.
Table 3B reports raw results from the Dic-
tator game. Subjects from the “message draw”
treatments exhibited no significant differences in
their propensity to choose the “Selfish” (6–3)
option, when compared to the Control subjects.
Contrary to the conjecture that a heavily untruth-
ful treatment would prompt more selfish prefer-
ences and thus explain a higher likelihood of an
untruthful message choice, subjects who drew
few Untruthful messages (two or less) were
more selfish on average (but not significantly
more).
These conclusions are reinforced by pro-
bit regressions of Sender message and Dictator
decisions, as reported in Table 4. Several spec-
ifications are reported, using different measures
of the treatments. In the last specification, we
gauge the impact of Sender beliefs about the
proportion of truthful Senders on their message
(and Dictator) decisions. Owing to the potential
for endogeneity between these expressed beliefs
and actual decisions, we instrument the belief
variable with a dummy for “highly untruthful”
(three or more U) message draws; the instru-
ment performs well in the first stage (in the
predicted direction) and, as expected, the instru-
mented belief variable has a significant positive
effect on subjects’ propensity for truthfulness
and no significant effect on subjects’ propen-
sity for selfishness. Direct effects of untruthful
treatments (number of U draws, or dummies for
a high number of U draws) are also estimated
to have a significant negative effect on subjects’
propensity for truthfulness. In some cases, these
treatments have a significant impact on “selfish-
ness,” but this effect is not robust and is nega-
tive, contrary to the conjecture that “untruthful”
treatments engender more selfish preferences.
Table 5 provides one last examination of
whether treatment effects on preferences over
allocations (generous vs. selfish) can explain the
contagion that we observe in subjects’ propen-
sity for truthfulness. We present difference in
difference statistics (propensities for untruth
minus propensities for selfishness, treatment
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TABLE 4
Probit Regressions for California Sender Decisions
Model
1 2 3 4


















Number of U messages drawn −0.2611∗∗∗
(0.0967)/
[−0.1031]
Dummy for 3–4–5 U messages −0.8888∗∗∗
(0.3072)/
[−0.3398]
Dummy for 4–5 U messages −.8930∗∗∗
(0.2961)/
[−0.3349]























Number of U messages drawn −0.2308∗∗
(0.1081)/
[−0.0785]
Dummy for 3–4–5 U messages −0.5000
(0.3321)/
[−0.1704]
Dummy for 4–5 U messages −0.6207∗∗
(0.3086)/
[−0.2169]





Notes: Number of observations = 105. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets.
aThe Sender belief is instrumented and identified with the treatment dummy for a draw of 3, 4, or 5 Untruthful Sender
messages. The first-stage F statistic (p value) for the identifying instrument is 9.57 (.0026).
∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
minus control) for the different treatments. Con-
sistent with our raw results (Table 3A), we find
that subjects’ net excess propensity for untruth
vs. selfishness is significantly higher for sub-
jects exposed to the heavily untruthful treat-
ments (with 4 or 5 U draws) than for Control
subjects.
In sum, we again find support for the con-
tagion hypothesis in the sense that a strong
propensity for untruthfulness is contagious. In
addition, we find that this contagion cannot be
explained by treatment effects on preferences
over allocations.
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
In our U.S. experiments, we find that infor-
mation indicating a strong peer propensity for
dishonesty promotes untruthful behavior. A cen-
tral motive for our work is to study the poten-
tial for contagion in the other direction: In a
country where corruption is high, and a propen-
sity for dishonesty presumably correspondingly
high, can subjects be spurred to more truth-
ful conduct by information suggesting a norm
of honesty? India—with a corruption index
in the highest tier of countries—is arguably
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TABLE 5










O U messages 4 −50.00 −0.75
1 U messages 12 −41.67 −0.81
2 U messages 11 −45.45 −0.98
3 U messages 11 −27.27 −0.02
4 U messages 25 12.00 2.85∗∗∗
5 U messages 16 18.75 2.35∗∗
0–1–2 U messages 27 −44.44 −1.22
3–4–5 U messages 52 5.77 2.49∗∗
∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
an ideal country in which to examine this
question.
In the Spring of 2009 and Summer of 2011,
we conducted a deception experiment with a set
of 131 Sender/Receiver pairs of undergraduate
students at Jadavpur University in Calcutta. Like
most university experimental labs, Jadavpur
maintains a roster of willing experimental par-
ticipants and regularly announces opportunities
for participation in experiments. Our announce-
ments were made in English, and were only
made in Departments where English fluency is
required (most of the University, excepting the
Bengali major). In the experiment, the following
two payoff options were posed:
Option A: 160 Rupees to you (the Sender)
and 160 Rupees to the other student (the
Receiver).
Option B: 200 Rupees to you (the Sender)
and 100 Rupees to the other student (the
Receiver).
As in the U.S. experiments, option labels
were varied randomly. The payoffs were de-
signed (a) to have the same ratio of Receiver
loss to deceit and Sender gain (3/2) as in our
Arizona experiment, (b) to meet minimum pay-
ment requirements, and (c) to give substantial
stakes to the choices made. Although 40 Rupees
(the Sender gain from dishonesty and Receiver
acceptance) is less than one U.S. dollar, aver-
age daily per capita consumption expenditures
in India are less than 19 Rupees in rural areas
and 35 Rupees in urban areas.17 Put differently
17. See “Household Consumption Expenditure in India
(January–June 2004),” NSSO, Government of India,
November 23, 2005.
(quoting Fehr et al. 2008), “Fifty Rupees are
roughly equal to a day’s skilled wage.” The
stakes in our experiment can therefore be con-
sidered substantial in context.
Following our Arizona design, we conducted
three treatments: a control with no information
about Sender behavior in prior sessions of
related experiments, a strongly truthful treatment
(Y = 15%) in which Senders were given the
following information:
Out of 15 Sender messages from a past session
of this experiment here in Calcutta, 13 out of 15
(85%) were TRUTHFUL and 2 out of 15 (15%) were
UNTRUTHFUL,
and a corresponding strongly untruthful treat-
ment (Y = 85%). Our initial control responses
in Calcutta gave us 15 Sender messages satisfy-
ing each of the treatment statements.18
Table 6 reports results from the Calcutta
experiment. We find that the honest treatment
leads to a significantly higher proportion of
truthful messages than in the control. Under the
treatment, the proportion of honest messages
is more than 50% higher than under the con-
trol, 69.2% versus 44.4%. Under the untruthful
treatment, the proportion of truthful messages
is a third lower than in the control (28.9% vs.
44.4%); however, the difference is statistically
significant only in a one-sided test (one-sided p
value = .06). The proportion of Senders predict-
ing Receiver acceptance is high (75.6%) and the
proportion of Receivers accepting their Sender
recommendations is also high (70.2%), although
less than in Gneezy’s (2005) experiments and
slightly less than in Arizona.19
In the Summer of 2011, we also conducted
an experiment at Jadavpur University that mim-
ics our California design. In this experiment,
each treatment subject (Sender) drew five mes-
sages from one of two boxes containing all
Sender messages (truthful or untruthful) sent
in a prior Calcutta experiment. Results from
this experiment are presented in Table 7. Sub-
jects who drew two or fewer Untruthful mes-
sages (out of five) exhibited a significantly
higher propensity for truthfulness (63%) com-
pared with Control subjects (44%), consistent
18. As in Arizona, all Senders were told that roughly
80% of Receivers accepted their Sender recommendations
in a similar prior experiment; none of this information was
provided to Receivers and Senders were so informed.
19. In the India experiment, a slightly higher fraction
of truthful Senders predict Receiver acceptance than do
untruthful Senders (80.6% vs. 71.0%), but the difference
is not statistically significant (z = 1.298).
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TABLE 6












Control 54 44.4 75.9
Y = 15% 39 69.2 −2.475∗∗ 76.9
Y = 85% 38 28.9 1.550 73.7
Overall 131 47.3 73.6
∗∗Significant at 5% level (two-sided).
TABLE 7
Calcutta Experiment: California Design




draws out of 5)
Untruthful (3–4–5 U
draws out of 5)
A. Deception
Observations 54 46 37
Percent Truthful 44.44 63.04 18.92
z Stat 1 (Cont. − Treat.) — −1.940∗ 2.686∗∗∗
z Stat 2 (012 − 345) — — 4.597∗∗∗
Average Sender Belief (SD)a 34.90% (19.05) 66.52% (22.60) 35.61% (20.79)
z Stat for Belief (012 − Ct/345)a 6.248*** — 6.476∗∗∗
B. Dictator
Observations 25 46 37
Percent “Selfish” 72.00 69.56 72.97
z Stat 1 (Cont. − Treat.) — 0.217 −0.084
z Stat 2 (012 − 345) — — −0.342
aBased on 25 Control observations.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
with our prior results. In addition, subjects who
drew three or more Untruthful messages (out of
five) exhibited a significantly lower propensity
for truthfulness (19%) than their Control subject
counterparts, giving us stronger evidence of con-
tagion in dishonesty. Subjects who drew two or
fewer Untruthful messages also revealed aver-
age beliefs about the fraction of Truthful Senders
that were significantly higher than for either the
Control subjects or subjects who drew three or
more Untruthful messages (see Average Sender
Belief in Table 7A). Hence, the experiment pro-
vides evidence that the message draws affected
Sender beliefs about other Senders’ truthful-
ness in the predicted direction. Finally, from
Table 7B, we see that our treatments had no
effect at all on Senders’ propensity for “self-
ishness” in the parallel dictator game: Whether
receiving no messages (the Control), two or
fewer Untruthful message draws, or three to five
Untruthful message draws, approximately 70%
of subjects chose the option that paid them more
and their Receiver less. Hence, as in the United
States, our treatment effects cannot be explained
by changes in preferences over allocations.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We conduct our experiments in the United
States and India in order to understand and
compare outcomes in a country with a low
CPI (the United States) and one with a high
CPI (India). Our related conjecture is that pre-
vailing norms are “more honest” in the United
States, and “more dishonest” in India. Inter-
national comparisons of experiments are prob-
lematic because payoffs cannot be mimicked;
a dollar in Rupees is not the same to a stu-
dent in India as a dollar is to a student in
California, and no attempt to “match up” pay-
ments can overcome this critique. However, set-
ting this concern aside, our twin experiments
yield results consistent with our initial conjec-
ture, given our choice of respective experimental
payoffs. On average, control subjects in Ari-
zona and California are honest with a relative
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frequency of 58.5%, while control subjects in
Calcutta are honest with a relative frequency
of 44.4%; the z-statistic for the difference is
1.742, significant at the 10% level (two-sided
p value = .0815).
In both countries, we find evidence of conta-
gion. In our India experiments, treatment effects
go in both directions: exposed to evidence that
a large proportion of subjects is dishonest, indi-
viduals are themselves dishonest with greater
frequency; conversely, exposed to evidence of
predominant honesty, individuals tend to be hon-
est more frequently. The first effect supports
the conjecture of self-reinforcing dynamics to
a social norm that is predominantly dishonest;
these are the dynamics that we argue in the intro-
duction can help explain a “two hump” country-
level distribution of social norms. The second
effect suggests that individual behavior is quite
sensitive to social information that is substan-
tially at odds with average behavior. This is
noteworthy. Despite relatively large stakes, our
Indian subjects become more honest to their eco-
nomic detriment in response to a social cue that
is contrary to the true norm. We interpret this
finding as a reason for optimism that the pro-
motion of honest norms can be successful, and
quickly so, if perceptions of peer behavior can
be changed.
In the United States, we find statistical evi-
dence of one direction of effect: a strong signal
of dishonesty leads to more dishonesty. Recall
that, in our U.S. experiments, there is a pre-
vailing norm of honesty with roughly 60% of
our control subjects choosing to tell the truth.
Our results thus suggest that this norm is fragile.
Even with small stakes, individual propensities
for honesty evaporate when peers are thought to
be dishonest.
In the other direction, our U.S. subjects, when
faced with social information that there is sub-
stantial honesty among peers, exhibit a greater
tendency to honesty. However, this difference is
not statistically significant. A possible interpre-
tation is that individuals who tend to be dishon-
est, contrary to prevailing social norms, are less
subject to social cues than either those who tend
to be honest or those whose tendency to dishon-
esty is in tune with (and potentially attributable
to) prevailing norms. However, we are loath to
make any strong statements. The insignificance
of these estimated effects, in the United States,
could be an artifact of our experimental payoffs.
In summary, we find evidence that both hon-
esty and dishonesty are contagious in the sense
that subjects are more likely to be honest (dis-
honest) when exposed to information suggesting
that other subjects have a higher propensity for
honesty (dishonesty). We find these responses
in both a high-corruption culture (India) and
a low-corruption culture (United States). These
responses shed some light on population dynam-
ics in truthfulness and corruption that may help
to explain societal tendencies to be in one camp
or the other, highly honest or highly dishon-
est. Normatively, they suggest value to a culture
of honesty in an organization by indicating the
fragility of truthful behavior; even with small
stakes, our U.S. subjects flocked to the dishon-
est course when primed with a social pass-go
to do so. Conversely, they suggest promise for
countering corrupt impulses in the developing
world if perceptions of norms can be reversed.
Of course this begs the question: By what
mechanism can norms be changed? Recent find-
ings suggest that this may be tough. Rode
(2010), for example, finds that dishonesty is
insensitive to cooperative priming, and Fis-
man and Miguel (2007) find that foreign diplo-
mats do not respond to American values of
lawful behavior. However, empirical evidence
indicates that aid and trade can reduce cor-
ruption (Gokcekus and Knorich 2006; Tavares
2003). Our results suggest a coarse mechanism
for this effect, but leave much unanswered.
For example, what determines whether “honest
norm” partners bend to the norms of “dishon-
est norm” partners or vice versa? If an “hon-
est norm” agent seeks to trade in a “dishonest
norm” country that is relatively closed, then is
the honest trader likely to bend to local (dishon-
est) norms? And how does a subject’s exposure
to another country’s norms affect his behav-
ior in his own country? These questions lend
themselves to further experimental work that can
illuminate not only the nature of the contagion
we identify, but also how it can be exploited
for positive social ends and what implications it
has for one of the key pillars of the globalization
debate: benefits of trade in reducing corruption.
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